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Abstract
The decline of Dasanech pastoral economy in recent decades, due to increasing
marginalization by powerful external political and economic forces, has forced the majority
of Dasanech to move to areas along the Omo River and its active delta or around the
northeastern shores of Kenya’s Lake Turkana. Radical reduction of river flow volume, lake
retreat and elimination of the river’s annual flood brought about by the Gibe III dam,
together with dam enabled irrigation agricultural enterprises, would destroy the key
components of Dasanech livelihood. Most flood recession agriculture would be eliminated,
along with ‘last resort’ livestock grazing lands, forest resources and ﬁsh reproductive
habitats in the lowermost Omo and Lake Turkana northern shoreline. Even if the highly
unlikely and in any case inadequate artiﬁcial flood program promised by the Ethiopian
government were implemented, Dasanech survival systems would have already been
decimated. The looming crisis of region-wide hunger and mortality is intensiﬁed by the
Ethiopian government’s eviction and expropriation of thousands of Dasanech villagers for
large-scale irrigated commercial agriculture. Political repression and a culture of fear prevail.
As the crisis unfolds, Dasanech communities, faced with vanishing means of survival, would
inevitably contribute to rapid escalation of cross-border, interethnic armed conflict.
Dasanech Pastoral Decline: Roots and Responses
➢ Throughout the ﬁrst half of the twentieth century, the Dasanech pastoralists sustained a system of wide-ranging
movements throughout the region’s dryland plains, as did other indigenous groups in the transboundary region.
These movements ranged across different types of habitats (Carr 1977; Bassi 2011), facilitating diversiﬁed food production
and complex patterns of risk minimization, as described in Chap. 4.
By the second half of the century, the combination of direct territorial restriction by the Kenyan and Ethiopian governments,
conflict with other disenfranchised pastoral groups in the region and other pressures effectively conﬁned the Dasanech to the
plains west of the Omo River and east of the Kibish River for many years. The Dasanech were forced to relinquish most of
these areas:
• The upland plains of the Ilemi Triangle—formerly, a ‘buffer zone’ created by agreement between the Ethiopian
monarchy and the Kenyan colonial administration.
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• Grasslands in the Kenya/Ethiopia border area to the northwest of Lake Turkana and southeast of the Ilemi Triangle—
especially critical during drought periods.1
• Woodlands and grasslands along the Kibish River, Koras Mountain and much of the pasture lands between Koras
Mountain and the Omo River (Fig. 1.3)—lands previously shared with the Nyangatom but increasingly fought over as
resource degradation and loss of land access have taken hold in the region.
• Semi-arid plains and relatively wetter foothills east of the lowermost Omo River, due to hostilities with the Hamar group
to the east (Fig. 1.3).
These territorial restrictions caused severe overcrowding of Dasanech livestock, with a loss of access to critical
resources during prolonged drought and other stress periods. Centuries old risk minimization and recovery strategies of
the Dasanech were no longer effective. With no relief available to them, the Dasanech were subjected to continued
deterioration of their lands, and the herds of individual pastoral families plummeted.
While Dasanech pastoralism persisted in the second half of the twentieth century (Fig. 7.1), their livelihood was severely
threatened to the point where major adjustments were necessary for their survival.
➢ Widespread ecological degradation was evident throughout much of their remaining territory by the late 1960s and early
1970s. Instead of the uniquely complex, mosaic-like complex of habitats and vegetation, vast areas became susceptible to
invader species of plants—a process that has continued to the present. This writer studied the structure and floristics of
‘natural’ versus disturbed grassland communities in major plains habitats, including including relict sandy beach ridges,
black cracking (margallitic) clay basins and ancient floodplains adjacent to the Omo River (Carr 1977). There are some
common features of ecological deterioration in these different communities:
• Sharp reduction of total vegetation cover with the creation of signiﬁcant bare areas.
• Invasion and spread by numerous ‘disturbance indicator’ plant species—mostly unpalatable species.
• Increasing erosion (both water and wind driven) with the loss of topsoil. Much of this degradation is irreversible in
practical terms, particularly once sheet erosion and certain species invasion occur (most recently, Acacia nubica,
A. horrida and Prosopis juliflora—the last of these, an introduced species, has spread throughout the region). Vast areas
are now with negligible plant cover and susceptible to intensive wind and water erosion.
This writer (Carr 1977) described ‘phases’ of this deterioration for much of the lowermost Omo basin based on construction of
ecological (vegetation and soil) transects along a gradient of grazing pressure in the above geomorphic units (Figs. 7.2 and 7.3).2
Most Dasanech pastoral lands are now so severely degraded that their recovery potential is in serious question,
even under the best of circumstances.
➢ Dasanech elders uniformly describe the degradation of their grasslands as the most important change in their
survival efforts, at least until the recent aggressive policies by the GOE along the Omo River. The statement of one
Dasanech elder on the west bank, recorded in 2011, is illustrative of the narratives throughout Dasanech lands.
When I was a young man, our land was big. Now we don’t live in those lands, as the governments have taken them
from us, and now they let others into our lands. Once we had the lands of good grass, but now we have no grass
except for short times when the rains come, and even then the grass goes away quickly. Before, there were so many
wild animals roaming the land: topi, oryx, wildebeest, lion, cheetah, foxes and many more. Now most of them are
gone. Have they gone north? Or west? They have been chased away by the loss of grass that is killing our cattle too,
and killed by poachers and by those who have gotten many guns from the war.
1The British administrator from Kenya (Mr. Whitehouse) who played a key role in the decision to remove the Dasanech (termed the “Marille” by
the Kenyan government) from this region described to this writer that no account was taken of the Dasanech population or neighbors’ survival
needs in boundary determination.
2Grassland and other vegetation types west of the Omo River are determined by a combination of factors including ancient sediment depositional
patterns (for example, alluvial and fluvial—with soils ranging from silty clay relict floodplains through margallitic, or black cracking soils to sandy
beach ridges) and land use pressures.
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Fig. 7.1 Dasanech herders and livestock. Top Cattle at pastoral village in highly overgrazed area. Center left Women slaughtering goats in
pastoral village. Center right Young male herder at stock camp. Bottom left Mid-day milking. Bottom right small stock watering at Omo River
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Pastoral Dasanech households (Fig. 7.4) attempted to recover from unprecedented resource losses by any means
possible. Among other adjustments, they altered their seasonal herding patterns, lessened the mobility of villages—relying
instead on highly mobile stock camps, utilized all types of social cooperation and exchange relationships, and engaged in
raiding of neighboring groups deemed hostile at the time. This writer studied these complex patterns during the 1970s, with herd
sizes, seasonal movements and production activities recorded for six different village areas, indicated in Fig. 7.5 (Carr 1977).
The differentiation of Dasanech social segments is reflected in the ‘nodes’ of pastoral settlement: for example, the Rendelli
segment is distinguishable from Inkabela and Oro segments. These patterns were identiﬁed by this writer (Carr 1977) and are
summarized in Fig. 7.5. At the time, most Dasanech were pastoralists residing in the upland plains—taking their livestock to
the Omo River primarily during the dry seasons and especially during prolonged drought periods. Those Dasanech
households engaged in flood recession agriculture along the Omo River went there primarily during periods of intensive
farming labor, although some Dasanech were well-established there in semi-permanent villages. A signiﬁcant proportion of
villages along the river were of the Eleli segment of the Dasanech, for example. Some of the poorest Dasanech had already
begun ﬁshing in the lowermost delta and along Lake Turkana’s northern shoreline in the delta.
A series of prolonged drought periods in the region during the 1970s and 1980s, accompanied by increased livestock raiding
between the Dasanech, and their neighbors—especially the Turkana and Nyangatom, greatly worsened Dasanech coping
efforts. Herd numbers plummeted for the vast majority of households. Kenyan ofﬁcers administrating the Ilemi Triangle
began permitting Turkana pastoralists back into Ilemi lands by the 1980s, so even the longstanding ‘illegal’ but persistent
use of the Ilemi by the Dasanech became sporadic, at best. This situation continues to the present day.
Fig. 7.2 Pasture deterioration phases in upland plains. Dominant and comparable soil type in Dasanech region of the lower Omo basin (sandy-silt
soils on relict beach/interridge areas)
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The urgency for additional grazing lands for Dasanech livestock in these three different environments emerged from a
combination of factors, including:
• Worsening environmental degradation of the dryland plains, due to overgrazing, with increased livestock mortality and
herd losses.
• Increasing hostilities with neighboring groups, particularly the Turkana and Nyangatom.
• Continued exclusion from the Ilemi Triangle (and contiguous lands dominated by the Turkana).
Fig. 7.3 Phases of ecological decline in lower Omo basin pastoral
lands. Top left Ilemi Triangle ‘healthy’ grassland—well-drained
silty/sand relict beach ridge. Top right young herders with cattle in
seasonally inundated cracking clay grassland basin within the Ilemi
Triangle with relict beach ridge behind. Center photos two intermediate
overgrazed conditions in silty/sand soils with discontinuous cover and
plant ‘invader’ species. Bottom photos Severely overgrazed conditions;
left—unpalatable vegetation (e.g., Cadaba rotundifolia, Euphorbia
nubica) severely malnourished cattle
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Conflicts between Dasanech and Nyangatom communities intensiﬁed, as both groups competed for water and grazing at the
seasonally flowing Kibish River, where they have long done extensive well digging in the dry months, in lands around Koras
Mt. and eastward to the Omo River (Fig. 1.1). They also competed for settlement, wild food gathering and hunting locales
along the Omo River. Similar conflict relations existed with the northern Turkana—primarily over access to the Ilemi region
and the grasslands of the Ethiopia-Kenya border region northwest of Lake Turkana. Venturing into these lands for the
Dasanech was at great risk—both because of possible Turkana and Nyangatom attack and because of seizure of their
livestock and sometimes shootings by Kenyan police.
Adapting from Upland Pastoral Life to Diversified Economy at the River
Faced with rapidly diminishing herds and environmental degradation throughout their pasturelands, by the early
1980s, Dasanech pastoralists had no choice but to rely on the Omo riverine zone and lake environments, both for last
resort grazing and economic diversiﬁcation to recession agriculture. The only real options for them were locales
(i) within the delta, which was actively expanding (see Chap. 1), (ii) along the river upstream from the delta to the southern
extent of the Nyangatom—initially, along the west bank (due to the danger of attack from the Hamar to the east), and
(iii) around the northeastern shoreline of Lake Turkana to Ileret, Kenya—and southward along the lake (Fig. 1.3). At ﬁrst,
most Dasanech settlements in these area were seasonal, but over time many of them remained throughout the year.
The overall migration pattern is shown in Fig. 7.6. Some Dasanech pastoralists remained highly mobile, even with greatly
diminished herds. The more mobile pastoral households continued sending stock camps to the eastern Ilemi Triangle from
Fig. 7.5 Seasonal movement patterns of six Dasanech settlement areas west of the Omo River. Source Carr (1977)
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Fig. 7.6 Dasanech settlement migration from upland plains to Omo riverine zone: 1960–2011
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which they were ofﬁcially excluded, as well as around Koras Mountain and the Kenyan-Ethiopian border areas—including
the coveted grazing lands of Meyen and Labur. (Their use of the Ilemi lands, however, was with strong risk of having their
livestock seized by police and herding in the border lands and around Koras Mountain carried equal danger of attack by the
Turkana and Nyangatom (a reciprocal threat that remains and intensiﬁes in times of stress).
In spite of these efforts to access their traditional lands, Dasanech pastoralists continued to suffer major cattle and small
stock losses. They became increasingly dependent on the Omo River zone for both water and pasturage. Even pastoral
villages remaining several kilometers away from the Omo River had at least some family members engaged in food
production in the riverine zone—primarily flood recession agriculture and ﬁshing.
Several new possibilities for Dasanech livelihood activities emerged during the 1980s, even though these have been
wholly insufﬁcient to compensate for their massive economic decline.
• The Omo delta began a period of expansion southward, with its terminus extending well into Kenya’s Lake Turkana
(Fig. 1.2). This new delta area has amounted to more than 500 km2 for possible new settlement as well as livestock
grazing, flood recession agriculture and ﬁshing.
• Local Kenyan ofﬁcials began permitting the Dasanech to return to the arid lands around the northeastern shoreline of
Lake Turkana where the group had once resided. Large numbers of Dasanech, particularly from one cultural segment,
responded to this opportunity. In fact, many of them continued southward from Ileret to their fluctuating border with the
Gabbra (Fig. 1.3). Relations between the Dasanech and Gabbra are generally hostile although they were once largely
peaceful, with resource sharing in many locales. Hostilities have intensiﬁed as available pasturage has disappeared.
Settlement shifts by most Dasanech from their degraded upland plains to the Omo River and Lake Turkana
environments directly reflects the failing economic conditions for the group as a whole.3 Many Dasanech who settled
west of the Omo began moving back to the riverine zone on the east bank of the Omo River—lands where they had resided
decades earlier. The danger of attack by the Hamar to the east effectively conﬁned their villages and herds close the river.
A variety of village and household livelihood patterns have emerged, but with overall economic decline and shift in food
production activities (Fig. 7.7). Despite the Dasanech’s long-term cultural dislike of ﬁshing, an increasing number of the
poorest households have had no choice but to begin ﬁshing in the channels of the lowermost Omo River or the northernmost
waters of Lake Turkana. The number of ﬁshing households has increased substantially since the 1980s, for several reasons.
ﬁrst, the plains environment and livestock herds have continued to deteriorate; second, the traditional lands of the Ilemi were
no longer available; and third, the Ethiopian government has evicted thousands of villagers from their riverine lands—
forcing most of them into the already crowded Omo delta where planting land is scarce. A wide variety of subsidiary but
essential livelihood activities are carried out in both riverine and upland areas (Fig. 7.8).
➢ Tens of thousands of Dasanech now reside in three major areas along the lowermost Omo River—the west bank, the
east bank and the active delta region. There are no reliable demographic data for these Dasanech, despite the obvious
importance of such information for a detailed assessment of the human impacts that would be caused by the Gibe III dam.
SONT researchers identiﬁed major Dasanech village areas that are variously seasonal or of year-round duration. Village
areas recorded and the large zone of GOE expropriation of villagers from their settlements and riverside lands are indicated
in Fig. 7.9.
GOE population estimates vary from 40,000 to more than 200,000. The Ethiopian government’s census results were
clearly projections rather than actual village based counts—projections likely generated in towns well removed from
Dasanech settlements. Villagers throughout the region emphatically state that neither government nor other individuals have
3Although strong differences in wealth have long existed, the resulting precipitous herd decline affected the Dasanech as a whole, since those stock
owners fortunate enough to retain larger herds were obliged to distribute at least some of their wealth to varying combinations of clan, age-set and
afﬁne (in-law) relations. These social structural relations are best described by Almagor (1978).
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visited to record census information.4 Staff members of non-governmental organizations engaged in periodic relief opera-
tions amongst the Dasanech expressed their frustration at having to rely on ofﬁcial government estimates.
Any ﬁgure between these extremes points to the major numbers of Dasanech whose lives are threatened by the Gibe III
dam and dam enabled irrigated agricultural development.
It is likely that the European Investment Bank’s impact report (EIB 2010) relied on GOE population ﬁgures, given the EIB
consultant’s statement that the duration of its ﬁeld investigation of the entire area from the Gibe III dam to Lake Turkana was
only ten days. Such a period is wholly inadequate for even a minimally acceptable population sampling among the
Dasanech. Estimates based on satellite imagery without extensive ground-based investigation would be entirely inaccurate,
since Dasanech village complexes fluctuate in location—sometimes extremely rapidly—in response to shifts in pasturage,
water, disease, immediate security and other conditions. Moreover, villages visible in satellite images are often abandoned
ones, or reoccupied by another ethnic group—especially common in contested areas. There are also major Dasanech
settlement shifts between Kenya and Ethiopia, reflecting rapidly changing environmental and socioeconomic conditions.
SONT researchers could not conduct systematic population counts, due to GOE restrictions and widespread fear of gov-
ernment reprisals by villagers. Dasanech village areas were therefore identiﬁed only through ground reconnaissance, and
primarily during the dry season (Table 7.1). Small scattered villages were not recorded.
The combination of information from all reliable sources, including SONT’s own ﬁeld-based investigation in selected village
areas and several non-governmental ofﬁcials interviewed, suggests a minimum Dasanech population of 60,000 to 70,000
—an approximate ﬁgure, at best. Whatever the accurate ﬁgure for the Dasanech population, it is clear that there are tens of
thousands of them residing along and nearby the Omo River with their livelihood dependent on sustainment of and access to
the Omo River.
Fig. 7.7 Major Dasanech livelihood decline from upland pastoral economy (west side of the Omo River)
4These villager statements were corroborated by a senior government ofﬁcer in Omorate (see Fig. 1.3 and maps below), who afﬁrmed to this writer
that no ground census had been carried out.
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Fig. 7.8 Dasanech woman making dugout canoe from a tree trunk in a small clearing in the Omo riverine forest
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Fig. 7.9 Zone of Ethiopian Government Expropriation of Dasanech villages and livelihood areas
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While these villages (many of which are included in the map of Fig. 7.9) were recorded during the dry season and
some of them are seasonally mobile or have shifted altogether, their presence during all or part of the year indicates the
extreme dependency of the Dasanech on riverine resources.
• The economic decline of the Dasanech, the dominant sequence of which is summarized Fig. 7.7, is evident from
household data collected by this writer, in 1970/1972 and 2009/2010. Of 75 households surveyed in the 1970s,
information was updated for 35 of them in the latter period (Table 7.2). Households from the original survey were
randomly selected from four of the six major pastoral settlement areas indicated in Fig. 7.5.
A number of patterns are evident from these household timeline data:
• All of the 35 households recorded had relocated—mostly to the riverine/delta zone—due to major changes in their key
production activities.5 Most had diversiﬁed their production from herding to include flood recession agriculture or
ﬁshing, or both. Nearly all households moved part or all of their members to the riverine/delta region, seasonally or year
round. Signiﬁcant shifts in authority and other social relations have accompanied these changes (Fig. 7.10).
• Precipitous herd decline has overwhelmingly driven this economic transformation (with minor exception). Some
households lost all livestock; most lost a quarter to two-thirds of their cattle, while small stock losses varied considerably.
• As cattle herds have declined, Dasanech herders have relied more on small stock since they are far more adapted to
degraded pastures and to days without watering. Dasanech long-term cultural preference for cattle over small stock has
been dominated by this necessary shift.
Dasanech herd owners on the west bank and in the delta were interviewed concerning their loss of livestock to disease.
A typical response was:
Only a few people near Omorate got help for livestock diseases. Those living in the delta and the whole west bank
received no help from the government.
• Some herd owners diversiﬁed their economic production and managed to partially rebuild small stock herds though barter
or sale of grain or ﬁsh.
Table 7.1 Dasanech village complexes along the Omo River: 2009–2010













































Koranyilutu (Koro Nyingabite) Naichari
Three areas of villages were identiﬁed: west bank, east bank and active (modern) delta
5The relative similarity or difference between the speciﬁc household in question and neighboring ones from the original sample was also recorded.
Names of household heads are excluded for the protection of individuals.
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Table 7.2 Dasanech household wealth status and livelihood change. Households from west bank of the Omo River: 1972 versus 2009
1972           2009






D-Delta   
# 




Farm        Fish 
Village    
Location
# 





1 P 140 180 No No P 38 30 Yes No
2 P 150 45 No No P/R 40 48 Yes No
3 P 60 0* No No R/D 18 30 Some Some
4 P 28 65 No NO R/D 5 22 Yes No
5 P 47 5* No No D 0 0 No Yes
6 P 280 350 No No R/D 15 0* Yes Yes
7 P 44 60 Yes No R/D 18 24 Yes No
8 P 120 210 No No R 35 68 Yes No
9 P/R 32 44 Yes No D 0 5 Some Yes
10 P/R 30 12 Yes No D 2 0 No Yes
11 P 310 155 No No R 34 50 No No
12 P 41 15 No No R/D 15 33 Yes Some
13 P 58 40 Some No P/R 22 6* Yes No
14 P 155 85 No No P/R 10 34 Yes No
15 P 550 200 No No P/R 18 400 No No
16 P/R 50 30 Yes No D/R 12 22 Yes (Yes)
17 P 210 60 Yes No R 32 85 Yes No
18 P 800 110 No No R 160 60 No No
19 P 540 85 No No P 105 73 (Yes) No
p
20 P 65 38 Yes No R/D 40 55 Yes (Yes)
21 P 75 22 No No R/D 14 5 Yes No
22 P 0 8 Yes No D 0 0 No Yes
23 P 80 130 (Yes) No P/R 65 60 Yes No
24 P 90 45 (Yes) No R 20 48 Yes No
25 P 82 70 No No R/D 7 36 Yes (Yes)
26 P 125 150 No No R/D 26 38 Yes No
27 R 4 23 Yes Yes D 0 5 Yes Yes
28 P 87 110 No No R 26 44 Yes No
29 P 12 15 Yes No D 0 3 No Yes
30 P/R 4 15 Yes No D 0 3 No Yes
31 P 65 50 (Yes) No R 16 24 Yes No
32 P 90 55 No No P/R 80 110 (Yes) No
33 R 12 20 Yes No R/D 10 48 Yes (Yes)
34 P 65 30 No No P/R 20 35 Yes (Yes)
35 R 0 4 Yes Yes D 0 0 No Yes
aLost in raids by neighboring Nyangatom or Turkana
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• Households with remaining livestock now depend on grazing locales within the Omo riverine and active Omo delta lands
during much or all of the year. Although most Dasanech are now agropastoral, many of the households with remaining
livestock depend on last resort grazing lands such as dipa—a locality of the eastern delta with relatively rich pastures.
According to villagers, waters from both the Omo River and Lake Turkana sustain these grasslands.
Last Resort Survival: Desperate Dependence on Omo River Annual Flood
➢ Most Dasanech now have major dependence on the Omo riverine zone—for flood recession agriculture, dry season
and ‘last resort’ livestock grazing, ﬁshing and a host of secondary production activities. All of these depend on the
sustainment of the Omo River’s annual flood.
Settlements and major livelihood activities in the delta vary from seasonal to semi-permanent. Most of the latter are located
along the river above the maximum flood level. Including in the uppermost portion of the delta. Livestock herding in the
delta fluctuates widely with seasonal changes—from short visits, especially during drought months, to year-round presence,
depending on environmental and social conditions.
Dasanech households and communities practice flood recession agriculture on annually flooded waterside flats upstream
from the delta, on some low riverbanks along the water’s edge, and within the active delta (Fig. 7.11).6 Contrary to the
Fig. 7.10 Dasanech male elders in the Omo riverine zone
6Other opportunities exist for flood recession agriculture, including a few locales where backup of Omo river waters into the terminus of gathering
streams (for example, Kolon—see Fig. 4.3) or incomplete channels. Some oxbow meanders well north of the Dasanech—for example, in Kara
lands (Fig. 1.3) also provide conditions for flood recession agriculture when they are inundated with Omo River waters during high flow periods.
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Fig. 7.11 Flood recession agriculture and Dasanech planters. Top left Dasanech girl in flood recession farm in delta. Top right agricultural plot
burned prior to flood. Center Omo inside bend with sandy/silt spit—annually flooded with agricultural plot; adjacent forest does not flood. Bottom
left Dasanech riverside village. Bottom right Dasanech tending farm at the river
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GOE’s assertions, they do not plant in the relict floodplains because flooding does not occur in these vast flats—nor has it for
thousands of years. As described in earlier chapters, overbank flooding does not occur upstream from the modern delta,
except in a few small localities where there is a break in the natural levee.
Also contrary to GOE and development bank reports, rainfall in the lower Omo basin is insufﬁcient for farming, as a brief
conversation with any local resident substantiates.7
While a relatively small number of Dasanech were practicing flood recession agriculture along the Omo River well back in
the twentieth century, flood dependent planting has now become the dominant means of survival for tens of thousands of
villagers. In the early years, planting on seasonally flooded riverside flats was a means of minimizing risk through production
diversiﬁcation, rebuilding herds through bartering grain for livestock and fulﬁlling social obligations (see Chap. 4). Par-
ticularly after livestock losses following territorial constriction caused by government actions, extended drought, disease,
and raiding by neighboring groups, Dasanech households exchanged grain from their farms along the Omo for small stock
and other items. Small grain reserves were widely evident and recorded by this writer in the early 1970s.
➢ The Dasanech consistently describe their present crisis as one of too little flooding, not excessive flooding. This is true
for both the active delta and the upstream waterside localities—together accounting for the majority of Dasanech settlement
in recent years. Chapter 6 details the GOE’s false claim of frequent major floods that are destructive of human life and
property.
SONT researchers recorded these statements by Dasanech agropastoral and ﬁshing elders.
• We have to move with our households and animals to stay close to the river channels and the delta where there is
water and grass for us and our animals and where we can farm. Lands east of the river are bare and dry, except when
there is good rain. We only ﬁnd food and water here. [Female agropastoralist, western edge of Omo delta]
• We never had such hunger in my father’s and my own time—until recently, when we became old men. Only this
hunger can force us to farm and even eat ﬁsh! Herders do not eat ﬁsh—the ﬁsh eaters are the ‘dies.’ Our times were
better. Our land was good for all Dasanech and even a man with fewer animals could eat well from his animals. The
animals were healthy, and they gave much milk. We didn’t have all this bush—it has come to now when we have lost
our land of good grass. I used to stay with my animals in the grasslands. Now I must be at the Omo River where I have
learned to farm. I must farm because my family will not eat from our few animals. Even people with many animals
don’t get enough milk. And when the flood doesn’t come to our land, and we cannot farm, we eat ﬁsh. I don’t want any
more of our children to die, so we eat ﬁsh. [Riverside male elder]
➢ Most Dasanech communities are now dependent on the Omo delta and its immediate environs for their survival—
whether for their direct use of delta resources for livestock grazing, flood recession agriculture or ﬁshing, or their
indirect but vital use of exchange relations with delta villagers.
• The southward expansion of the Omo delta to its present 500 km2 area has coincided with the Dasanech’s diversiﬁcation
to agriculture, ﬁshing and wild food gathering (Fig. 7.12). Large numbers of impoverished Dasanech would otherwise
have faced catastrophic level conditions of hunger. As noted in previous chapters, the Omo delta was previously a limited
land area with ‘birdfoot’ morphology (Fig. 1.2) and had few localities suitable for planting, livestock grazing and
settlement.
• The total area utilized for flood recession agriculture varies widely, depending on flood conditions and multiple other
factors. Based on SONT ﬁeld observations and satellite photos, a medium to high range of 4000–6000 ha is a reasonable
estimate for such planting—from Omorate southward to Lake Turkana, including the modern Omo delta.
7When the ephemeral Kibish River (which dissipates in the dry Sanderson’s Gulf, just south of Koras Mt.) has sufﬁcient flow, flood recession
agriculture is done along the riverbanks. Presently, large numbers of Nyangatom are settled around Kibish.
Last Resort Survival: Desperate Dependence on Omo River Annual Flood 127
Fig. 7.12 Dasanech Life along the Lower Omo River. Top left Girls in
flood recession farm near the delta; wooded natural levee in rear. Top
right Goats watering at Omo River. Center left Extremely malnourished
cattle at watering. Center right East bank Dasanech ﬁshers with catch.
Bottom Agropastoral village near the west bank, in the delta region
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Although no precise estimation of the number of hectares utilized for recession agriculture or the population
dependent is feasible without ground-based survey and direct interviewing of local residents, an estimate of tens of
thousands of Dasanech facing such destruction is entirely reasonable.
Under the present conditions of region-wide political repression and fear of Ethiopian security forces in virtually all
villages, combined with the GOE’s effective ban on independent research in the area, establishing reliable baseline
data for the precise population under threat from loss of flood in recession agricultural lands—like the estimation of the
population in general—is not possible. These data are critical for the precise assessment of the crisis unfolding,
• Environmental conditions in the delta are diverse—providing opportunities for multiple production activities that
combine to provide the survival of Dasanech communities. This comment by a villager to this writer is typical in its
reference to the importance of this aspect of the delta.
Many people here have some small stock, but they don’t give enough milk. So a lot of people have to rely on what they
can harvest from their farms. In some places, the crops do well if they get flood from the river, but in some places there is
no flood and crops fail, so people have to ﬁnd other ways to survive, like eating ﬁsh or buying grain from those who have
it. [Dasanech female elder at village on west bank in delta area]
• Villagers throughout the delta typically are flexible in their production activities in response to their changing conditions.
Both settlement locations and resource use patterns within the active delta naturally shift with changes in Omo channel
morphology and the river’s annual flood as well as other environmental and social factors. A majority of villages in the
western portion of the delta have been relocating to its central and eastern portions due to the threat of Turkana attack,
decreased annually flooded lands and reduced planting locales on the western margin, drainage conditions that favor
woody vegetation (shrubs), and tsetse infestation. Villagers with calves often have no option but to have them graze crop
stubble (Fig. 7.13) when floods are insufﬁcient to replenish vegetation in their locales.
Dasanech village settlement areas and flood recession agriculture locales active at the time of SONT research are indicated in
Figs. 7.9 and 7.14. Many of these locales are now expropriated (see below). The map also indicates desiccation of the region
that would result from the radical reduction of the river’s flow volume and inflow to Lake Turkana, brought about by the
Gibe III dam and large-scale irrigation commercial agricultural along the river.
➢Within the modern delta, a mosaic-like pattern of different vegetation types and water conditions has developed with
the recent expansion of the delta—providing habitat for livestock grazing, ﬁshing and food gathering. The fluctuating
and critically important wetland habitat and sharp transition between riverine and upland environments (on the west bank)
are shown in Figs. 7.15 and 7.16. The GOE’s ESIA (GOE 2009) falsely describes a far more mesic (relatively wet)
environment than is in fact the case—even presenting a highly detailed vegetation map indicating an active river channel
departing the river just above Omorate to Lake Turkana. This channel (locally termed Amolo, is actually a relict one.8
• Dasanech planting on low riverside flats (including point bars and low sand/silt spits) and within the modern delta plant a
variety of crops, including these traditional ones:
sorghum/millet—Dasanech name—‘ruba’ Pigeon peas—gadda
maize—nakapono other vegetables—eri
squash—bote; gourds—turum tobacco—tampo
sweet potato—lokoto beans—am haamo
8The signiﬁcance of this misrepresentation is that it suggests the existence of a relatively “favorable” environment for ‘alternative’ resource use by
the Dasanech. In fact, this channel is an ancient one and the channel hasn’t flowed for many years. Formerly an active part of the Omo River
system, only pools of water form during rainy periods. The relict floodplains around the Amolo channel are generally poor soils—cracking clays
and silts.
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Except for sorghum, which is critical for meeting both subsistence and exchange needs, these crops have long been grown
primarily for household consumption. Sorghum has lower water requirements than maize and it is well suited to shifting
river conditions—certainly by comparison with maize. Moreover, in a good flood year, planters can produce two sorghum
crops and sorghum seeds are available le from previous harvests. Beyond its importance as a household food staple, sorghum
is widely traded for small stock (sheep and goats), even cattle—both within Dasanech economy and in the broad arena of
interethnic exchange (Fig. 1.6). Sorghum yields are determined by multiple factors including type of sorghum planted, extent
and duration of Omo River flood, soil type and land use practices. Experienced Dasanech planters up to ﬁfteen or twenty
distinct types of sorghum. “It all depends on the floodwaters,” according to most respondents.
Several major soil types prevail in the delta zone where flood recession agriculture is practiced. These vary among sand, silt
and clay-like textures. Although two of these (locally termed maal and digirte) are considered by most to be superior,
planting is done in a wide range of soils, with different degrees of flooding. Tools are simple—primarily axes (hoolte), sticks
(yugeny) and ‘pangas’ (nyewolo). Labor patterns are flexible, with men generally doing more of the clearing and harvesting
while women perform much of the planting and weeding as well as assist in harvesting.
Labor for flood recession agriculture is highly variable among communities. Some have pervasive cooperation in most
phases of farming while others have relatively sharp household delimitation of plots accompanied by limited cooperation—
primarily for land preparation and harvesting. Problems of crop diseases are sometimes severe, especially from insects and
rust. Dasanech villagers consistently state that the Ethiopian government has not helped them deal with these diseases; in
fact, most complained of no agricultural services at all from the government. This major hardship for the river dependent
Dasanech parallels that of the pastoralists. Contrary to GOE reports, village elders flatly state that they have received no
Fig. 7.13 Calves in starvation condition grazing in stubble of riverside farm plot
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Fig. 7.14 Desiccation of modern Omo delta and northern end of Lake Turkana predictable from Gibe III dam and dam-linked irrigation systems.
Destruction would include flood recession agriculture, last option grazing and ﬁshing habitats
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Fig. 7.15 Wetlands at the Omo delta terminus at Lake Turkana. Dasanech cattle grazing
Fig. 7.16 Dasanech village complex at shoreline near northwestern extreme of Lake Turkana, close to Omo delta wetland
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government assistance for the rampant and often devastating livestock diseases affecting their herds. Moreover, very few of
them have access to the extremely limited NGO assistance in the area.
Dasanech knowledge and management of these conditions has been key to the sustainability of these systems—as distinct
from unsustainable ones introduced and commercial style developments brought to the region by the government and private
interests. When crops fail in parts of the modern delta, for example, agropastoral villagers may sell or barter some of their
remaining small stock to households with more successful harvests in order to obtain sorghum.
With the retreat of Lake Turkana (Figs. 1.2 and 7.14) and expansion of the modern delta in recent decades, tree and shrub
growth has increased alongside decreased flow in the main western river channel, according to local residents. Farming has
declined in these areas and villages have moved to central and eastern portions of the delta where annual floods facilitating
recession agriculture are more likely to occur. Even where flooding occurs in the western delta, crop yields are diminished.
➢ Reciprocity relations between Dasanech and pastoral and agropastoral households, as well as among the region’s
ethnic groups, have long been critical to the survival strategies of all. These include strong east/west bank exchange
relations (Fig. 7.17). Many pastoral Dasanech settled near the river plant in the delta region by negotiating labor-sharing
arrangements with households there. For example, livestock owned by the delta residents are sometimes sent to stock camps
in Kenya-Ethiopia borderlands northwest of the lake with labor provided by herders from west bank villages. In return, west
Dasanech of the east bank and eastern delta commonly trade with the Hamar to the east—especially exchanging their
sorghum for Hamar small stock. They also acquire knives, axes, earthen pots and hides from the Hamar, who have better
access to these highland products. Dasanech settled on the west bank and in the western delta, on the other hand, are more
likely to trade their agricultural product (primarily sorghum) for Turkana small stock—conflict conditions permitting. When
relations between the two groups are relatively peaceful, Turkana herds may even be permitted to graze in the delta region,
in return for wet season grazing by Dasanech herds in Turkana controlled lands.
Fig. 7.17 Dasanech crossing Omo River at high flood stage for transactions between west bank residents and Omorate traders. Natural levee
supports closed woodland—without overbank flooding
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Without a successful sorghum harvest, the Dasanech in the riverine and delta region are often forced to sell their remaining
livestock in order to survive. This has in fact been the case for countless households in recent years. East bank Dasanech
agropastoral households, for example, often have no alternative but to market their remaining cattle or small stock in
Omorate or other markets frequented by Hamar, Arbore or Kenyan Somalis.
➢Wild food gathering is critical for Dasanech survival, especially during harsh times. These include periods of prolonged
drought when livestock milk and other products are reduced or when for example, the omo annual flood is insufﬁcient for
agriculture or for successfull ﬁshing. The poorest Dasanech—those without livestock or farm plots—rely on this food source
much of the time, particularly in recent times.
Most wild food gathering is done in the riverine and delta zones—precisely the environments most in line for desiccation
from the destroyed from the effects of the Gibe III dam and irrigated commercial agricultural enterprises.
➢ Fishing is done by thousands of Dasanech households and is key to survival of most of them. It is no longer limited to
the ‘poorest of the poor’ communities and households. The critical role that ﬁshing, as well as recession agriculture, has
Agriculture have come to play, in the face of major herd decline, is stated by this elder in the southeastern Omo delta:
We eat ﬁsh every day. If others have sorghum, they will cook it and eat it. Some of us have been ﬁshing for a long time
—more than those others. Other Dasanech came to join us after they lost their cattle and small stock from drought and
disease. Thousands of us are here! Many of our people died because they had nothing to eat—and before they could
get here to try to plant or ﬁsh.
• Fishing communities utilize their catch for varying combinations of domestic consumption and exchange—whether
barter or cash sale in local markets. Dasanech ﬁshers exploit whatever river and lake locales they can access, depending
on Omo River flow patterns and annual flood occurrence, seasonal shifts in ﬁsh life cycles, availability of ﬁshing gear,
security conditions and other factors. Major ﬁshing areas include the lowermost Omo and fringing Omo delta channels
and the nutrient-rich waters along Lake Turkana’s northern shoreline—waters nourished by the river’s annual freshwater
and ‘pulse’ that sustains ﬁsh reproductive locales there (Figs. 5.2 and 7.14).
The most common ﬁsh caught by the Dasanech at the mouth of the Omo channels and along Lake Turkana’s northern
shoreline are tilapia and Nile perch. The most common catch species for the Dasanech are the same as those for Turkana
ﬁshers (see Chap. 9). Dasanech male ﬁshers also hunt crocodile and hippo at night—the populations of which have
radically dwindled to the point of endangerment9.
Many ﬁshing households still use the simplest of technologies: metal spears and harpoons with string (from barter with
other ethnic groups), locally crafted dug-out canoes fashioned from riverine forest trees (Fig. 7.8) or simple rafts
constructed from doum palm trunks lashed together (see photos in Chap. 9). Others have wooden boats and nets, with
additional gear. Dasanech ﬁshers originally obtained much of their knowledge of ﬁshing, as well as ﬁshing technology,
from the Turkana. They now acquire equipment through barter, purchase and capture. During investigations in Turkana
villages along the lake’s northwestern shoreline, for example, this writer recorded numerous accounts of violence—
killings as well as gear thefts—between Turkana and Dasanech ﬁshers.
➢ Dasanech ﬁshers report rapidly declining ﬁsh catch, especially with the incursion of commercial ﬁshing fleets based
in Ethiopia—companies promoted and protected by the GOE. Commercial catch is primarily destined for urban
Ethiopian and export markets. Efforts to develop facilities for ﬁsh refrigeration and processing were initiated by the GOE for
years, with active solicitation of investment by the SNNPR and federal government by the early years of this writer’s
investigation, when three major companies were active in the lowermost river and in Kenya’s Lake Turkana.
9Hippos and crocodiles, like other riverine zone wildlife (elephant, buffalo, primates including colobus monkey and baboon, a wide range of
reptiles, etc.) lived in abundance along a major proportion of the lower Omo river during this writer's early ﬁeld work (e.g., in the early 1970s).
Hunting was nearly incidental until the 1980 s when the GOE began developing Omorate and enterprises along the river, and when ﬁrearms
became increasingly dominant in communities throughout the region. Much of the wildlife population would require restoration if this natural
heritage of Ethiopia (and basis for tourism) is to be valued differently from the wholesale destruction underway. Young males—now often with
little accountability to elders—often kill for sport.
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Company boats easily overwhelm the poorly equipped indigenous Dasanech and Turkana ﬁshers. Villagers in the delta
describe enormous ﬁsh discard (waste) by the motorized commercial boats, including large deposits of ﬁsh bones and other
waste, that create major problems for their small nets and also destroy ﬁsh reproductive and feeding habitats. One Dasanech
ﬁsher responded this way when asked for his view of the foreign ﬁshing boats:
What is bad about them is the amount of ﬁsh they kill. Some of them [ﬁllet] the ﬁsh right there and throw the waste in
the lake, so this makes the lake water poisoned. We get small nets from some of them, but mostly we are losing our ﬁsh,
so nets don’t help us if the ﬁsh are gone.
The Ethiopia-based ﬁshing corporations have steadily increased their catch range into Kenya’s Lake Turkana, where they are
in clear violation of that nation’s sovereignty. These company boats extend their ﬁshing ventures as far southward as North
Island (Figs. 1.3 and 5.2), often display the Ethiopian flag and are often accompanied by Ethiopian guard boats. They pay no
fees to Kenya, nor do they obtain ﬁshing licenses or make catch reports to Kenya’s local Beach Management Units.
Turkana representatives from villages along the northwestern shoreline have appealed to the Kenyan government numerous
times to expel the foreign fleets, and Kenyan ﬁsheries ofﬁcials are fully aware of the situation. As of early 2015, the Kenyan
government had taken no effective action, despite innumerable requests by Turkana ﬁshers and their representatives—
including in the locally based Beach Management Units. Nor have the development banks, in their assessments of lake
conditions, ﬁshery status or socioeconomic conditions (AFDB 2009 and 2010) raised the issue of the incursion and impact of
Ethiopian commercial fleets in these Kenyan waters on ﬁsh stocks and on the worsening interethnic conflict among ﬁshers.
What amounts to state-sponsored piracy into Kenyan waters is a matter of international sovereignty, but also
greatly worsens the crisis faced by vast numbers of Kenya’s Turkana whose livelihood is dependent upon the
lake’s ﬁshery.
➢ Violent conflicts between Dasanech and Turkana ﬁshers who are increasingly desperate to secure catch from these
northern waters constitute a major problem in the region. The northernmost portion of the lake accounts for many of
the ‘hotspots’ of conflict expansion (Fig.5.3).
The frequent violence over gear theft and sporadic killings noted above frequently spreads to pastoral and agropastoral
communities in the region (and visa versa) with extensive series of reprisals between the two ethnic groups. The frequent
points of conflict among ﬁshers—indicated in the map of Fig. 5.3—are also the likely points of major expansion of local
conflicts into regional ones. This trend is already well underway and is greatly ampliﬁed by the plummeting of livelihood
resources as a result of Gibe III dam and irrigated agricultural development.
Governmental, non-governmental and U.N.-based accounts of conflicts among ﬁshers and in the border region generally
exclude consideration of the actual causes of this mounting crisis. Instead, the ‘solutions’ prescribed are most often either
interethnic ‘mediation’—without account of the real dynamics at play—or additional militarization by the Ethiopian and
Kenyan governments, or both.
Ethiopian Expropriation and Political Repression of Riverine Communities
The Ethiopian government is engaged in extensive and systematic human rights violations of tens of thousands of
indigenous pastoralists and agropastoralists along the Omo River, downstream from the Gibe III dam site, in order to
pave the way for new commercial agricultural enterprises. Evictions of villagers and expropriation of their riverine
resources by GOE police and militia frequently involve beatings and arrests—and reportedly, torture. Dasanech
resistance to their dispossession nevertheless occurs, when possible.
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➢ GOE denials of its expropriation actions are contradicted by available planning documents over many years. As
detailed in Chap. 6, the Ethiopian government excluded mention of its obvious plans for such large-scale commercial farms
in its environmental and social impact assessments. Gibe III feasibility and planning documents over the years—including
the AFDB-funded Master Plan for the Omo River basin (Woodroofe & Associates 1996), for example—assessed hydro-
electricity and irrigation potential. The EIB 2010 assessment included a map of the GOE’s projected commercial agricultural
development along the river (Fig. 7.18). In 2009, this writer was directly informed of the government’s ambitious plan for
agricultural development and major irrigation in the lowermost basin during a discussion with a senior agricultural ministry
ofﬁcial in Addis Ababa.
In the 1980s, the Ethiopian Derg’s commitment to large-scale irrigated agricultural development on indigenous lands was
evident from the Ethio-Korean project at Omorate (Fig. 7.9). The GOE and major international aid organizations have
prioritized hydrodam development with agribusiness and power production over indigenous land rights since the Koka dam
and Awash Valley developments during the post-war Haile Selassie years, despite well-documented disastrous impacts on
the Oromo and Afar peoples in the Awash Valley (Bondestam 1974; Carr 1978; Kloos 1982), and elsewhere. (Chapter 2
outlined the early decades of comprehensive planning for dam and dam-linked irrigated agriculture in Ethopia’s river basins,
including this prioritization.).
The speciﬁcs of Ethiopian and foreign ownership of the commercial farm development are relatively well documented along
the Omo in the traditional territory of the Mursi and neighboring groups (Fig. 1.3). Hundreds of thousands of hectares are
leased or planned for Ethiopian, Indian, and European and other corporate and private investors (Human Rights Watch 2012;
Oakland Institute 2011). Information presented by Turton and colleagues at the University of Oxford (available at www.
mursi.org) reports that 30 of the 52 Mursi and Kwegu villages (at least 58 % of them) are in areas that are either already
delineated for sugar plantation development or are being offered by the government of Ethiopia for private agricultural
development. According to this ﬁeld-based data, the expropriation process involves 73 % (114 of 157) of Mursi and Kwegu
agricultural sites. Even two individual sugar block plantations total more than 162,000 ha, with a planned total of 245,000 ha
for sugar plantations.
Table 7.3 indicates key concessions documented by the above-mentioned NGOs and researchers during investigations
between 2010 and 2013.
The above ﬁgures exclude enterprises underway or planned further downstream, especially the transboundary section
of the river. Government prohibition of visitors and investigators has been extreme in the lowermost basin where the
Dasanech and Nyangatom also face eviction, particularly since 2009. ‘Observations’ by international aid groups
allegedly investigating possible abuses in the area (including USAID and DFID), moreover, are generally ‘facilitated,’
or ‘informed’ by the GOE itself.
The major crops planned for these commercial farms are cotton, sugar and oil palm, with agricultural product directed to
international export and Ethiopian urban markets. These crops are high water consumption/chemical-requiring crops. These
agribusiness industrial enterprises require major water diversion through canals and irrigation channels, as well as facilitation
of chemical/waste discharge into the Omo River—both having disastrous effects on both downstream Omo and Lake
Turkana peoples and environments. The extensive irrigation systems are already partially constructed and undergoing
expansion. These include a large number of diesel pumps for water diversion and large canals.
➢ Like the Mursi/Bodi ethnic residing upstream, the Dasanech and Nyangatom face major evictions by the GOE for the
establishment of large-scale, irrigated commercial agriculture and supporting infrastructure. While it is known that
private investors along the lower Omo River are from Ethiopia, India, China, Europe and the U.S., but information regarding
speciﬁc individual, corporate and government owners of these irrigated commercial farms are difﬁcult to obtain due to the
GOE’s refusal of access to the area by investigators and to the government’s policy of extreme surveillance. All of these
effectively prohibit local residents from providing information and places them under threat of severe reprisal.
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Fig. 7.18 Planned and potential irrigated agriculture in the lower Omo River basin. Some lowermost riverine zone planned farms (expropriation
areas) are omitted. Source GOE map in EIB 2010
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Evictions of Dasanech villagers and expropriation of their recession agricultural and last resort grazing lands for these
enterprises have been underway for years, along with the construction of irrigation and canal works. Political
repression accompanies all of these actions since opposition is not tolerated by the GOE. The impacts are cataclysmic
when they are combined with radical reduction of river and lake waters by the dam and irrigation systems.
The underreported estimate of lands seized by the GOE for commercial use along the river in Dasanech and Nyangatom
traditional lands—more than 120,000 ha, according to the now outdated Human Rights Watch estimate—is vastly increased
if both east and west bank commercial farms along with irrigation and canal construction are considered.10
• Evicted villagers have no realistic survival options. Nearly all households now have too few livestock to move back
into a pastoral life and in any case the rangelands are severely deteriorated. Moving into the modern delta is difﬁcult even
in the ‘best’ of circumstances. There are already tens of thousands of Dasanech residing there or at least claiming delta
lands there are suitable for flood recession agriculture.11 Residents in nearly every Dasanech village complex along the
Omo River have either experienced GOE eviction or expropriation themselves or have been impacted by the influx of
villagers subjected to these processes elsewhere.
• Closure of the dam would immediately initiate desiccation of the Omo delta—the very lands where the expropriated
Dasanech take refuge in order to survive (Fig. 7.14). For many of them, ﬁshing has become their last livelihood option,
along with whatever success they may have in accessing flood recession planting in the already overcrowded delta.
• Last option survival by ﬁshing along the lowermost Omo and along Lake Turkana’s northern shoreline would be
eliminated by the multi-kilometer retreat of that shoreline that would follow closure and early operation of the planned
dam with no real reservoir water release.
Tens of thousands of Dasanech relying on annual flood in the Omo delta or who evicted from lands upstream along the
river would face massive scale conditions from the impacts of the Gibe III dam and dam-linked irrigated agriculture.
Figures 5.2 and 7.14 indicate the desiccation of delta and lakeshore areas caused by these developments.
The GOE’s eviction of Dasanech (and Nyangatom) from their flood recession farms and settlement areas is evidence enough
of the government’s true development intentions in the South Omo. The government’s priority of commercial development
Table 7.3 Selected irrigated agricultural enterprises in the lower Omo basin




(formerly Ethiopian Sugar Corporation)
Koka Oil Palm Plantation
31,000 ha
palm oil, sesame, rubber trees
Lim Siow Jin Estate
(Malaysian company)
15 smaller land concessions
111,000 ha




Fri El Green Power (Italian company)
Total: Minimum of 445,000 ha
Company, farm size and crop formation from Human Rights Watch (2012), Oakland Institute (2011)
10SONT researchers recorded speciﬁc areas of GOE eviction or expropriation of Dasanech villagers, but for political security reasons, did not
attempt to quantify the size of farms being established or planned.
11Finding lands in the Omo delta for their livelihood is extremely difﬁcult for these evicted communities, even when they have strong social ties
(deﬁned social ‘segment,’ or clan terms), since the Omo delta lands are already overcrowded. Some of them attempt ﬁshing and move even closer
to Lake Turkana’s northern shoreline.
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over the survival of its indigenous population is starkly evident from its public statements and investor solicitations.
The administrator of Debub Omo Zone, in an interview for Fortune magazine, stated:
We granted the land to the company along the Omo valley, which is the most suitable area for the plantation of palm
oil, to encourage investors to come to the region with the prospect of exploiting this huge potential.
Dasanech village settlements and lands listed in Table 7.4 were among those expropriated by the GOE, according to local
resident reporting to SONT researchers, mostly during late 2012 and early 2013.
➢ The GOE’s planning and impact assessment documents describe agricultural development plans as part of ‘com-
munity development and ‘social services’ provision—a clear misrepresentation of the reality of the lowermost Omo
region as well as GOE policies. The following false statements in the GOE’s downstream impact assessment (GOE 2009)
reflect this misrepresentation.
The following examples of such statements by EEPCO ofﬁcials illustrates GOE fabrication of its development plans for the
“beneﬁt” of the Dasanech.
• The South Omo project area is “hardly inhabited at all except at a widely scattered pattern,” and that the population
density “at the South Omo project site is below ﬁve persons per square kilometer.”12
To the contrary, SONT researchers documented thousands of Dasanech living in major village complexes along the west
shore of the Omo River riverine zone in proximity to one another, as indicated in Fig. 7.14. This condition is manifest, even
to the casual observer visiting the riverside zone.
• The government “will not displace a single person involuntarily in Gambella, or elsewhere within the country.”
Firsthand accounts by Dasanech elders, describing their evictions from settlements and lands (Table 6.4), directly contradict
the government’s assertions.
• An irrigated land of 0.75 ha of land each is prepared for 2050 households. There will not be any land scarcity for
any family with a capacity to produce more. Training on improved agronomy practices, technology inputs and
livestock management including rangeland will be provided.
This statement is also false. The communities listed in Table 7.4 are among those whose riverside farming areas or settlement
areas have been expropriated. While thousands of villagers are expropriated with nowhere to go, the GOE frequently speaks
of ‘providing employment’ for the local population. A very few Dasanech are incorporated into selected commercial farms,
they are in essence wage labor, not ‘participants’ in local cooperative or community based development. SONT investigation
of two major expropriation/farm establishments on the west bank, for example, revealed that only 20 to 30 young men were
hired while hundreds of villagers were sent away.
➢ The Ethiopian government consistently describes its ‘consultation’ with local communities participatory. Dasanech
elders, however, consistently report that, the Ethiopian government has forcefully ordered them to vacate many of
their different their village locales, as well as major grazing and recession agriculture lands.
• Development bank documents refer to the consultations carried out by the GOE, but these rely entirely on the GOE’s
description of its actions, not that of local residents.
• A culture of fear prevails among Dasanech villages. Omorate based GOE militia and security personnel take
repressive, even violent measures against individuals and groups protesting their eviction and expropriation.
• Villagers’ acts of resistance—even questioning, have been met with swift and sometimes violent action by police
or militia.
12These (italicized) statements were made in a letter from the Minister of Federal Affairs in the GOE, in response to a letter from Human Rights
Watch in November of 2011. They are representative of numerous statements issued by the GOE’s EEPCO and other key government ofﬁcials.
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Table 7.4 Partial list of Ethiopian government evictions and expropriations of Dasanech villagers
EVICTION OF VILLAGERS AND FLOOD RECESSION CULTIVATORS:
WEST BANK OF THE OMO RIVER (2009 – 2012)
Goto: Eviction from extensive flood recession agricultural lands.
Thousands forced to evacuate to find new areas for planting and livestock grazing.
Large commercial farm established.                                        
Damish:  Eviction from extensive flood recession agricultural lands. 
Most households forced to find new resource areas for planting, livestock grazing.
Large-scale irrigated commercial farm established.
Nyemomeri:  Eviction from extensive flood recession agricultural lands.   
Eviction of village complex (evangelical missionary operations remain). 
Major canal construction westward, creating barrier to livestock movement.    
Large commercial farm established; water works. (A few Dasanech - as wage labor). 
Population forced to find new areas for subsistence    
Villagers remaining in the region highly subject to Turkana attack.
Akudingole: Eviction from extensive flood recession agricultural lands.
Villagers forced to find new areas for livestock, flood recession agriculture,fishing
Salany (Salin/Selegn): Eviction from flood recession agricultural lands.
Highly vulnerable to attacks by Turkana; plains severely degraded by livestock 
overgrazing due to exclusion from riverside lands. 
Many villagers forced to move, primarily into modern Omo Delta.
Kolon Lochuch: Most villagers evicted from flood recession plots.
Village remaining, but a substantial percentage of the population forced to
leave in search of new planting locales.
EVICTION OF VILLAGERS AND FLOOD RECESSION CULTIVATORS:
EAST BANK OF THE OMO RIVER & MODERN DELTA INTERIOR
Afewerk/Afor: Government-run large farm – established early 2006. 
Kapusie:  Government-run large farm — established in 2006/2007.
Ediporon: In the modern Omo Delta; no agricultural land, but impacted by the influx   
of evicted villagers and their livestock into the delta.
Bokom (both west shore & delta interior villages):  impacted by new settlers and 
their livestock. Flood recession agriculture land heavily impacted by influx of 
evicted Dasanech from villages upstream.
Source SONT interviews with west bank Dasanech elder residents, 2010 June–2013 January
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By local accounts, such government ‘consultations’ have consisted of meetings where a few government representatives and
a number of ‘trusted’ local residents, with ofﬁcials explaining the ‘major beneﬁts’ that will come to the villagers as the result
of the Gibe III dam and large-scale irrigation systems. One Omorate ofﬁcial stated to this writer that he had actually ﬁlled out
the forms of “community approval.”
The Dasanech (and Nyangatom) have had no real experience with small or medium scale dams, let alone knowledge of
a megadam and how it would affect their lives.13
➢ There is historical precedent for the expropriation of Dasanech lands and eviction of villagers along the Omo River.
Following the overthrow of Haile Selassie in the mid-1970s, the new military regime greatly increased the government’s
presence in the lower Omo region. Until that time, direct government presence had little impact except when pastoral groups
had been forced out of certain territories by Ethiopian and Kenyan government forces.
• The government’s establishment of the ‘frontier-style’ town of Omorate along the east bank of the Omo (Fig. 1.3)
furthered the displacement process of prior years and led to the rapid incursion of traders and other outsiders. This caused
serious incidences of HIV infection, alcoholism, prostitution, and other social problems previously unknown to the
indigenous communities. Within a short time, Omorate became the hub of large-scale agricultural development. The
program used the rationale of settling the pastoralists. Highland agricultural ofﬁcers in Addis Ababa viewed this
development as “for their beneﬁt”14
By the 1980s, Omorate emerged as the Ethiopian government’s police and administrative center, as well as a town of
trade. This has produced unprecedented mixing of Dasanech, Nyangatom, and Kara people and drawn substantial
numbers of individuals from other ethnic areas of Ethiopia.
The 1980s incursion by the national government for agricultural ‘development’ and new police/administrative presence
came on the heels of many years of Christian evangelical missionary presence along the lowermost Omo—a presence the
government facilitated by alienating riverside common property of the Dasanech. Small numbers of local residents were
included in the missionary program, with certain conditions (villagers report have to become Christianized.)
Non-indigenous crops (bananas, tomatoes, mangos, cassava, etc.) have been grown rather than the traditional sorghum,
beans, sweet potato, pumpkin, maize and other crops consumed by local villagers. During SONT’s work, villagers had to
pay fees for use of missionary provided windmills.15 The impact on local systems of traditional land tenure, food, and
other product exchange, and social relations have been signiﬁcant.
• The large Italian palm oil plantation being installed just north of Omorate, on the east bank of the river, is in the same
locale as the Ethio-Korea Joint Agricultural Development Project—an irrigated commercial cotton plantation established
in the 1980s under the Derg. Like its predecessor, the palm oil plantation is situated in silty clay soils of the ancient
(relict) floodplain. These soils form numerous sinkholes and cracking networks, some of which extent to depths of more
than four meters and from major landscape features easily visible from satellite photos and aerial views. The enormity of
these cracks in the silty clay soils of the relict floodplains soils is evident in Fig. 7.19. Combined with the speciﬁc soil
texture and high evaporation rates, these cracking features favor major salt accumulation.
The Derg’s Korean-sponsored irrigated cotton venture was a failure—one repeated under subsequent non-governmental
organization management with major salt concentration, radically decreased soil fertility and invasion by intractable
non-indigenous plants unpalatable to livestock.
13Some Dasanech (and Nyangatom) herders are even misled by having seen very small dams (for example, 30–50 ft. ones) built across streams in
nearby northwest Kenya (one is just outside of Lokitaung (Fig. 1.3), where many have traveled for trading), or in the Ilemi. Herders view all of
these dams negatively, since they block stream flow and vegetation downstream that are vital for their livestock. These experiences obviously offer
no basis for comprehending the enormity of a structure like the Gibe III dam.
14This writer personally discussed plans for such development with ofﬁcials from the Ministry of Agriculture. They outlined their objectives of
settling the Dasanech (they persisted referring to them with the longstanding Amhara term, ‘Geleb’,) teaching them to “grow tomatoes” and “drop
their primitive ways”.
15Personal communication by this writer with missionary representative on the east and west banks of the Omo River.
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The planned large-scale agriculture in this locale is likely to suffer the same fate as the previous cotton plantation.
These soils are essentially the same in locales along the river where the GOE plans other irrigated commercial farms—
as distinct from the annually flooded flats where the Nyangatom and Dasanech have long carried out recession
agriculture.
➢ The GOE carried out another large expropriation of Dasanech communal grazing land on the east bank—a roughly 10,000
ha unit south of Omorate appropriated by an Ethiopian highlander favored by the Derg. This enterprise was abandoned in
1991, following the overthrow of the military government.
This land was later partly utilized by the present government to settle allegedly “displaced people” by the large flood of 2006
and for commercial production. Individuals at this plantation reported to SONT researchers that they were ordered into the
new settlement by the government, despite their wish to return to their traditional village areas after the 2006 flood subsided.
Their village areas had remained intact and many were not even flooded, according to residents, yet they were ordered to
move. By the new government plan, longstanding traditional tenural relations with common property and traditional
exchange systems were ended. By early 2010, Dasanech farmers here reported that they were required to grow speciﬁed
crops for the government’s storage facility or for government controlled marketing in Omorate. The GOE states that its grain
storage near Omorate, on the east bank, is “for Dasanech use” during times of hunger. Local elders insist that hunger already
prevails and that there is little or no assistance from the government, even in the worst of hunger periods. The Dasanech in
these government schemes view themselves as largely forced labor for the government. Since researchers other than those
under strict control and independent observers are prohibited from working in the area, these descriptions from Dasanech
villagers lack further detail.
GOE expropriation or eviction actions are absent from all GOE planning and impact assessment documents for the
Gibe III project, as is information regarding the GOE’s active solicitation of private investors for commercial Agri-
culture and other industrial development in the South Omo.
➢ Increasing hunger and lack of recovery options for thousands of Dasanech eicted from their riverine locales have
intensiﬁed hostilities between the Dasanech and their northern Turkana and Nyangatom neighbors, who face similar
conditions. Livestock raising, thefts of ﬁshing gear and boats, armed conflict and killings are widespread.
Locales in the transboundary region already with frequent conflict are shown in Fig.5.3. They include:
• Northernmost waters of Lake Turkana and the Omo delta region.
• Villages near the northwest lake edge, including Turkana settlement at Kenya’s Todenyang and in adjacent Ethiopian
lands.
• Ethiopia-Kenya borderland grazing (stock camp) areas northwest of the lake.
• Eastern Ilemi Triangle stock camp/herding locales.
Dasanech conflicts with the Nyangatom are most frequent in lands around:
• Koras Mt./ Kibish River grazing, watering and settlement areas.
• Eastern Ilemi Triangle herding and stock camp locales.
• Contested locales near the Omo River.
Violence among the region’s ethnic groups has frequently provoked intervention by local government security forces based
in the border areas of Ethiopia and Kenya. In the case of Ethiopia, these events frequently lead to increasing repression and
harsh measures by the Ethiopian police or militia—actions that are viewed by the Dasanech as part of the GOE’s evictions of
their communities and continual expropriation of water and land resources vital to their survival.
Although government, international aid agency, United Nations and ecumenical statements concerning conflict in the
Ethiopia-Kenya-Ilemi Triangle/South Sudan tri border region consistently cite or clearly imply ‘indigenous’ inter-
ethnic conflict ‘natural’ to the area. This is a major distortion of the historical reality of relations among these groups.
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Fig. 7.19 Cracking silty clays in relict floodplains, near planned irrigated commercial farm
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While it is true that conflicts have long been common among the Nyangatom, northern Turkana, Dasanech and a number of
adjacent groups, two overarching realities prevail:
• Relations among ethnic groups have long involved sporadic conflicts, but within a framework of broad, regional
social and material exchange systems, as well as sharing of grazing and water resources, among others.
• Major arms trafﬁcking in the region, especially that involving the conflict in South Sudan, has radically increased the
frequency and intensity of violence.
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